

"DOD Must Thoroughly Overhaul the Services' Roles and Missions"

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In 1986, after almost 4 years of work, study, and deliberation, the Congress passed landmark legislation reorganizing the Department of Defense. That landmark legislation, known as the Goldwater-Nichols Act, brought about a coordination and consolidation in the Department of Defense that had been sought 40 years earlier when President Truman stated in a message to the Congress that "There is enough evidence now at hand to demonstrate beyond question the need for a unified department." Those words triggered the process that established the Department of Defense.

Those who sought unification under a new Department of Defense had to reconcile their goals with those who sought to preserve the power and influence and prerogatives of the independent military departments that preceded it. The past 40 years have been filled with evolutionary changes on the road to complete reform. The Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 was the most far-reaching step yet taken to create a coherent, efficient, and effective Defense Establishment.

We saw the first tangible fruits of that act in Operation Just Cause in Panama and Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm in Southwest Asia. For the first time, the services were integrated in a way that combined the unique strengths of the individual services. As a combined force, our military capability totaled more than 100 percent of the sum of the parts contributed by each of the services. The unique contributions of the individual services were combined in an effective and innovative way to create the most capable military force in the modern era.

Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander in Chief of the US Central Command, testifying before the Congress at the end of Desert Storm, summarized the importance of Goldwater-Nichols: *Goldwater-Nichols established very, very clear lines of command authority and responsibilities over subordinate commanders, and that meant a much more effective fighting force in the gulf. The lines of authority were clear, the lines of responsibility were clear, and we just did not have any problem in that area—none whatsoever.*

Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney said: *I am personally persuaded that [Goldwater-Nichols] was the most far-reaching piece of legislation affecting the Department since the original National Security Act of 1947. ... Clearly, it made a major contribution to our recent military successes.*

Goldwater-Nichols has been a great success, in no small measure because men and women in the military implemented it with typical American determination. The Department deserves great credit for its implementation of both the spirit and the letter of the Goldwater-Nichols Act.

General Powell and Secretary Cheney are especially to be congratulated for their consistent efforts to implement the Act.

Roles and Missions of the Services Remains Unfinished Business

But even the success of Goldwater-Nichols did not complete the process of reform. There still is considerable unfinished business at hand. One of the biggest problems we now face is an item that Goldwater-Nichols addressed in a limited way, and that is the issue of the assignment of roles and missions of the military departments.

In 1947, when the Department of Defense was formed, one of the most fiercely debated issues was the roles and missions of the services. It was not merely an issue of pride and tradition although that certainly was part of it. It was an issue of power and resources. Controlling a mission meant having a claim to budget resources. The roles and missions of the services followed the historical evolution of responsibilities and capabilities of the Army and the Navy.

The Army was responsible for land operations and the Navy and Marine Corps for sea and coastline operations. But when new technologies--like combat aviation--emerged, the lines became fuzzy. A new service--the Air Force--was established, but the Navy, Marine Corps, and Army all continued to operate combat aircraft, arguing that organic capabilities were needed in order to carry out war on land or at sea. Satellites and missile technology were on the drawing boards, and the Army, Navy, and Air Force all wanted to be involved in these new technologies. Then Secretary of Defense James Forrestal sought to resolve the dispute by convening a meeting of the service heads at Key West, FL, and in 1948, the famous Key West Agreement was reached that set out the various roles and missions of the military services.

The problem, of course, with the Key West Agreement is that it largely failed to avoid the tremendous redundancy and duplication among the military services. As former Senator Barry Goldwater frequently said, we are the only military in the world with four air forces. We have a Marine Corps and an Army with light infantry divisions. Both the Navy and the Air Force design, build, test, and field cruise missiles. Both the Navy and the Air Force build and operate satellites. Each of the military departments has its own huge infrastructure of schools, laboratories, industrial facilities, testing organizations, and training ranges. We have at least three, and in some instances four separate Chaplain Corps, Medical Corps, Dental Corps, Nursing Corps, and Legal Corps. In certain cases Navy radios cannot operate interchangeably with Army radios. Navy aircraft require different types of aerial refueling equipment than Air Force aircraft. Air Force aircraft use chaff and flares that cannot be used by the Navy. The list goes on and on and on.

This redundancy and duplication is costing billions of dollars every year. Let me provide just a few examples of potential savings. The Army has 18 divisions and the Marine Corps has 4 divisions. If the Defense Department decided it could eliminate just two divisions and we would save nearly \$3.5 billion every year. The Air Force has 26 equivalent fighter wings, the Navy has 13, and the Marine Corps 4 wings, for a total of 43 wings. If the Defense Department decided it could eliminate just five wings of duplicative capability, we could save over \$1.5 billion annually. But more important, we would eliminate the need to spend \$18 to \$25 billion on new aircraft over the next 15 years. The Navy operates 12 aircraft carriers. If the Defense Department decided that long-range aviation could eliminate the need for two aircraft carriers, you save \$7 billion in operating costs and \$9 billion required to build two new aircraft carriers. Streamlining the logistics, administration, and management duplication among the services could save tens of billions annually.

Consideration of Roles and Missions During Deliberation on Goldwater-Nichols

During our deliberations on the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. David Jones—who with others like Gen. Shy Meyer deserves much credit

for initiating the reform process that led to the act—commented that one of the items too hard to solve as Chairman was the problem of roles and missions of the military departments. In order to get the Department to focus on the problem, we included in the Goldwater-Nichols Act a provision that requires that every three years, or upon request of the President or the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall submit to the Secretary a report containing such recommendations for changes in the assignment of functions—or roles and missions—to the Armed Forces as the Chairman considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the Armed Forces.

On September 28, 1989, the day before his retirement, Adm. William J. Crowe, Jr., then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, submitted to the Secretary his "Report on Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces." That report was the first such effort since the famous Key West Agreement in 1948 to address roles and functions.

One of the items Admiral Crowe called for was a sweeping reorganization of the intelligence organizations that support our forces. We are just now starting to see the fruits of that reorganization within the Department. This is a direct result of Admiral Crowe's initiative, but much more needs to be done in this area as well.

Deadline for Next Report is Approaching

The triennial deadline for the Chairman's next report is approaching. General Powell has indicated that he is already working on the report. This is a tough job. It is a job no one in the Department wants. Every Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with whom I have discussed this subject has said it is singularly the most difficult problem he has had to deal with.

General Powell and the service chiefs deserve credit for the steps they have already taken. General Powell pointed out that this past year a major roles and missions issue was addressed when the Department decided to have the Army relinquish any control over nuclear weapons.

This was a big change. From the earliest days of the cold war, the Army has had tactical nuclear weapons. And last year, the Department decided that the Army would relinquish the nuclear mission completely.

And as I mentioned earlier, the Department has created Joint Intelligence Centers, eliminating duplication that existed in various component commands. This will prove to be a very important step that will directly benefit our forces in the field in the future.

The Department is also undertaking a sweeping reorganization of peacetime medical care. A lead service will be assigned care in a certain region and be responsible for all medical services to all eligible personnel in that region. This is a very important step and one that could not be possible without strong leadership in the Department.

I would also note that there are examples of increasing joint and cooperative activity within the Department. The Navy and Air Force are jointly developing new types of air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council process is working to foster collaboration among the services in developing new weapon systems.

It is clear that the Department is beginning to work to streamline operations and to consolidate programs. But there is much more that needs to be done. The actions to date are noteworthy, but not all that far-reaching in terms of major roles and missions. Progress on these larger issues will require outside pressure and determined oversight by the Congress, by the President

and by the Secretary of Defense and increasingly, I believe, by the American public.

The Opportunity and Necessity for Change

We find ourselves at a unique point in history. We are leaving a security era that demanded large numbers of US combat forces stationed overseas or operating in forward locations at high states of combat readiness in order to confront a large and numerically superior opponent. That era has ended. We are entering a security era that permits a shift in our overall strategy toward smaller force levels, with smaller overseas deployments and lower operating tempos. The exact size and organization of this future force is still taking shape. It will be a smaller force than we have today, but with certain units that are immediately available for action in a crisis, supplemented by larger reinforcing forces that can be quickly mobilized and made proficient for combat within weeks or months. We will need much more flexible weapon systems and combat organizations that can be rapidly tailored for emergencies. We will need an adaptive command structure that can quickly configure task forces utilizing the capabilities and strengths of the various service units.

At the same time our country is facing an unprecedented fiscal crisis, largely of our own making. We are drowning in a sea of red ink. We are racking up an unprecedented national debt, fueled annually by massive deficits. We must find a comprehensive solution to this problem. And certainly one element of the solution is continued prudent reductions in the defense budget. These two factors—the reduction in the threat and the budget deficit crisis—represent the opportunity as well as the necessity of change. Now, as never before, we must address the issue of roles and missions in the Department of Defense.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act specified that the Chairman should consider three items as he reviewed roles and functions:

Changes in the nature to the threats faced by the United States.

Changes in technology that can be applied effectively to warfare.

Unnecessary duplication of effort among the Armed Forces.

During the past 3 years, I believe we have witnessed revolutionary developments that apply in each of these areas. The long-standing security threat that faced our country—the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact—collapsed and disintegrated. Operation Desert Storm witnessed the application in warfare of technology that has the most far-reaching implications—stealth technology, cruise missiles, precision-guided weaponry, advanced simulation and mission rehearsal, tactical ballistic missile intercepts, integration of space systems into combat operations, and so forth. While many of these new technologies had been available for some time, their application in warfare opened up new insights into how best to integrate combined forces. It also exposed continuing weaknesses in the interoperability of our forces.

And also in this same 3-year period, the Department has announced and is currently undertaking a far-reaching build-down of our military forces—closing hundreds of installations, deactivating a third of the Army's divisions, one-quarter of the Air Force's tactical fighter wings, 20 percent of the Navy's ships, and removing from deployed status nearly 70 percent of our strategic nuclear warheads. If ever there were a time for and a need for a systematic review of roles and missions, it is now.

Some time back, I was discussing this issue with Admiral Crowe. He said something I

considered very important which I believe needs to be part of the public record. He said that at every point in our history as a country, when we have faced the end of a period of military crisis and the start of an era of relative peace, we deal with our defense policy in a two-step process. The first step is to cut the defense budget. And when we do that we usually get a smaller version of what we currently have. The second step is to shape a new force in light of the changed circumstances. Admiral Crowe said that we have always tended to do the first step and failed to follow through with the second. That is why, he said, generals and admirals are usually prepared to fight the last war. It is not their fault, Admiral Crowe said, because the Defense Department only gives them a smaller version of what they had in the last war.

The services are currently in the middle of their build-down plans, and I think they are doing a good job. Some of the services are doing a better job than others. The Air Force, for example, has launched sweeping changes to its management and administrative structure. The other services are far behind the Air Force in this regard, but by and large they are doing a good job within their programs downsizing to a more realistic level. But there are virtually no major changes that cross service lines. For all practical purposes, each service is designing its own smaller future.

Need to Reshape, Reconfigure, and Modernize

We must break this historical American pattern of defense reductions. We should not go into the future with just a smaller version of our cold war force. We must prepare for a future with a fresh look at the roles and missions that characterized the past 40 years. We must reshape, reconfigure, and modernize our overall forces—not just make them smaller. We must find the best way to provide a fighting force in the future that is not bound by the constraints of the roles and missions outlined in 1948.

Framework for Reform

I do not pretend to have concrete, definitive answers to the roles and missions challenge. Certainly, there are many potential ways to streamline our operations. The framework I am going to outline is not prescriptive. It does not prescribe concrete solutions, but I hope my remarks will stimulate a constructive debate. There are 10 broad areas where there appears to be substantial duplication and potential opportunity for streamlining. Those areas are:

- Projection of airpower.
- Contingency or expeditionary ground forces.
- Theater air defenses.
- Space operations.
- Helicopter forces.
- Intelligence.
- Functional organizations and activities.
- Logistics and support activities.
- Administrative and management headquarters.
- Guard and Reserve component forces.

This list is neither exclusive nor exhaustive. There may be other, better opportunities for consolidation, realignment or further study and analysis. Some of these 10 might not turn out to be fruitful. But I am convinced it is time for General Powell to conduct a no-holds-barred, everything-on-the-table review of the current assignments of roles and missions among the military services. Here is where I would suggest they start.

Projection of Air Power

The first area of potential streamlining is projection of airpower. Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm provided compelling evidence of the critical role that airpower plays on the modern battlefield. Tactical aircraft were among the first forces in theater to deter further advances by Iraq, provided an ongoing air defense screen over Saudi Arabia while the reinforcement proceeded, and conducted an extremely successful interdiction campaign once the war started. But we spend tens of billions of dollars every year operating tactical aircraft squadrons in each of the four services. The services now have over 350 billion dollars' worth of new combat aircraft on the drawing boards, with only limited efforts to achieve commonality. We must find ways to save billions of dollars with streamlining and eliminating the duplication in this area.

Land-based Versus Sea-based Power Projection

We have two modes of airpower—land-based aviation and sea-based aviation. Land-based aviation provides the mass needed for modern air combat. Sea-based aviation provides presence in areas where land basing is not possible or until it becomes possible. Both are unique capabilities and assets we require. From my part of view, the issue is not whether we have one or the other. The issue instead is choice on the margin: As we invest scarce resources in coming years, what is the most cost-effective mix of forces?

As I review the service plans and programs, I note several items that cannot be considered apart from a careful assessment of roles and missions. For example, this year's budget request contains an \$800 million down payment on a \$4.8 billion aircraft carrier, and \$165 million to start the development of a \$60 to \$80 billion new stealthy medium-range bomber to fly off aircraft carriers, the so-called AX airplane. At the same time the Air Force is proposing to start a \$5 billion upgrade to the B-1 bomber.

This raises several important questions. What is the most cost-effective way to provide air interdiction in the future—with long-range bombers from the United States or with large numbers of aircraft carriers with medium-range bombers on their decks? What is the tradeoff between upgrading the B-1 bomber fleet and operating another aircraft carrier? What can a new AX bomber from an aircraft carrier do that our existing long-range bombers from land bases cannot do? Could Navy aircraft carriers utilize shorter range bombers—like F-18's—and let the Air Force provide the long-range bombing capability? Is the AX so important to the Navy that it will accept fewer aircraft carriers or give up the F-18E/F to get it?

The fundamental question is not what is best for the Navy or the Air Force. The question is what is best for America?

I am not saying we do not need aircraft carriers or do not need long-range bombers. But I do believe that as we look to a future of shrinking budgets and changing requirements, we need to make some clear-eyed decisions about the most cost-effective mix of these forces.

Duplicative Multirole Fighter Capability

These are other areas of duplication in airpower. The Navy operates F-18 aircraft as multirole fighters and the Air Force operates F-16 aircraft as multirole fighters. The Navy wants to buy a new version of the F-18 that will cost nearly \$5 billion to develop and \$55 to \$75 billion to procure. The Air Force wants to develop a new multirole fighter in the future to replace its current F-16 fleet. That airplane will cost tens of billions of dollars as well. During the 1960's and 1970's, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps all operated one fighter—the F-4, which was an extremely successful aircraft.

This raises several key questions: Can the services cooperate and develop a common multirole

fighter? Could the Air Force use the Navy's F-18 as its multirole fighter?

The fundamental question is not which airplane is best for the Navy or for the Air Force or the Marine Corps. The question is what is best for America?

The Air Force operates some 26 equivalent wings of fighter aircraft. The Navy operates 13 wings and the Marine Corps operates 4 wings. Each wing costs hundreds of millions to operate and train annually, and billions to outfit. Obviously, each of the services would like to keep all their own wings of aircraft. But we must ask some specific questions. Do we need separate and parallel fleets of multirole fighters in the first place? How many squadrons do we need and how many should be in the Navy, in the Marine Corps, and in the Air Force? Should each of the services have a complete cross section of types of aircraft or could the services specialize?

The fundamental question is not what is best for the Navy or the Air Force or the Marine Corps. The fundamental question is what is best for America?

Duplication Between Marine Corps and Navy

The Marine Corps will invariably enter combat in one of two conditions: Either underneath a general Navy air defense umbrella—as was the case in Lebanon—or as part of a combined arms operation—as was the case in Desert Storm—where the Air Force and Navy jointly provide for theater air defenses. In either situation, the Marine Corps could count on the Navy or the Air Force units to provide for deep interdiction and fighter air defense. The Marine Corps also utilizes aircraft as artillery, but is there a reason why a Navy or Air Force fighter could not provide this capability?

Both the Navy and the Marine Corps operate F-18 aircraft and have separate and parallel attack squadrons. I understand that the Navy and the Marine Corps may be planning some bold actions in this area by combining Navy and Marine Corps squadrons. The Navy and Marine Corps deserve high marks for taking the lead here. But can we go further? Could the Marine Corps, for instance, specialize in vertical flight—helicopters and AV-8B's—and the Navy specialize in fixed-wing fighter support? Could Navy helicopters be transferred to the Marine Corps while Marine Corps fixed-wing fighters are transferred to the Navy? Tough questions, but questions that must be asked.

The fundamental question is not what is best for the Marine Corps or the Navy. The question is what is best for America?

Parallel Electronic Jammer Aircraft Fleets

In another example, both the Navy and the Air Force operate standoff jammer aircraft to protect tactical fighters. The Navy's aircraft is the EA-6B, widely considered the best in the world. The Air Force jammer is the EF-111. The Navy has done a better job than has the Air Force of modernizing its jammer fleet. But ironically, even though the Navy has a better overall modernization program, budget pressure within Navy aviation is forcing them to stretch out the EA-6B program, and there have even been indications the program might even be canceled. In other words, both services are trying to maintain fleets of standoff jammers, but budget pressure is seriously limiting their modernization programs. Could the standoff jamming mission be assigned to one service so that we have one healthy modernization program for everyone rather than two weak, struggling programs?

The fundamental question is not what is best for the Air Force or the Navy. The question is what is best for America?

Contingency or Expeditionary Ground Forces Duplicative Infantry Divisions

The second major area of potential streamlining concerns contingency or expeditionary ground forces in the Army and Marine Corps. Both the Marine Corps and the Army operate light infantry divisions, although they specialize in different combat concepts and skills. Marine Corps infantry utilize amphibious assault while Army infantry units emphasize parachute assault, helicopter assault, and traditional dismounted infantry tactics. In my view, we need to retain these complementary skills.

Nonetheless, the Army has five infantry divisions in its contingency corps and the Marine Corps has three divisions. Each division costs nearly \$2 billion annually in personnel and operating costs.

Obviously, both the Army and the Marine Corps will say their respective capabilities are unique. But do we need eight divisions of contingency or expeditionary forces?

The future year defense program contains over \$7 billion to buy fast sealift ships largely to transport Army divisions, amphibious ships to transport Marine Corps brigades, and prepositioning ships to store the equipment and supplies of Marine Corps and Army units. The key question is, What is the right mix among fast sealift ships, prepositioned ships, and amphibious shipping to deploy, equip, supply, and sustain contingency and expeditionary forces?

The fundamental question is not what is best for the Army or the Marine Corps. The question is what is best for America?

Army Provide Tank and MLRS Battalions for Marine Corps

During Operation Desert Storm, the Army provided tank battalions and rocket artillery support to the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps has only four tank battalions, and two of those battalions have only eight tanks each. By contrast, the Army has over 35 tank battalions, each with 54 tanks. The Marine Corps would also like to buy 42 multiple-launch rocket system [MLRS] launchers, even though the Army has over 500 and provided MLRS support during Desert Storm.

Obviously the Marine Corps would like to have its own tank and MLRS battalions. But we must ask the following key questions. Can the Army provide armor and artillery support for the Marine Corps? Can Army tank and MLRS battalions train and deploy with Marine Corps expeditionary forces, freeing the Marine Corps to invest in unique capabilities that they can provide for other services?

The fundamental question is not what is best for the Marine Corps or the Army. The question is what is best for America?

Theater Air Defenses

The third area we need to examine as we review roles and missions is theater air defenses. Air defenses have always been a divided mission. The Army operates ground-based missile systems to use against enemy aircraft while the Air Force has fighters to shoot down enemy aircraft. This distinction reflects the historical agreements reached between the Air Force and the Army back in 1948. It may also have been a plausible division of labor when we confronted a massive Soviet threat in Europe. But Desert Storm demonstrated the power of modern tactical

airpower. Except for Patriot missiles against Scuds, the Army didn't shoot a single air defense missile at an enemy aircraft during the war.

Certainly we cannot say that every conflict in the future will follow a pattern set during Operation Desert Storm. But the overwhelming power of our tactical aircraft does suggest we ought to fundamentally reassess air defense. The Army would like to launch a new air defense missile system, and the budget request contains over \$100 million for upgrades tot current systems.

The Air Force is proposing to spend \$14 billion to develop and \$55 to \$70 billion to procure a new air superiority fighter.

Clearly we need to ask the following questions. Are new air defense missile systems needed given the success of and overwhelming superiority of our tactical fighter operations? Can the entire theater air defense mission be assigned to the Air Force?

The fundamental question is not what is best for the Army or for the Air Force. The question is what is best for America?

Space Operations

The fourth area of potential streamlining is space operations. While the Air Force has a dominant role in space operations, it is by no means an exclusive role. The Navy operates its own fleet of satellites. The military services have parallel and potentially redundant systems on the ground for monitoring and controlling satellites and duplicative design laboratories.

If you asked the Navy they would want to keep their own labs and facilities. If you asked the Army they would want to continue to operate their own facilities and ground stations. If you ask the Air Force they would want to keep their own systems and labs. The key question is obvious: Can one of the services be assigned the space operations mission on behalf of all of the Defense Department?

The fundamental question is not what is best for the Army or Navy or Air Force. The question is what is best for America?

Helicopter Forces

A fifth area for potential consolidation concerns helicopter forces. Five years ago the Air Force and Army Chiefs of Staff entered into an agreement to streamline roles and missions. One of their recommendations involved transferring all helicopter operations from the Air Force to the Army. That proposed transfer was sidetracked because of opposition from the Air Force helicopter community. The Air Force continues to operate several hundred helicopters, even though the Army operates over 5,000 helicopters. Were the chiefs of staff of the Air Force and Army right 5 years ago when they first proposed this move? Now that we are facing sharp reductions in budget authority, should we not take a look at this issue again?

Again, the fundamental question is not what is best for the Army or the Air Force. The question is what is best for America?

Intelligence

As I noted earlier, the Department has made great progress in streamlining its intelligence operations in support of our unified commanders. One of the recommendations that has been implemented by General Powell has been the creation of joint intelligence centers. This reform transferred intelligence capabilities from the component headquarters—Army intelligence analysts, for example—and brought them under the direct control of the unified commanders.

This had a tremendous impact on streamlining the intelligence process in Desert Storm. Nevertheless, there are a substantial number of intelligence units and organizations throughout the services. These organizations conduct intelligence activities and provide analysis that mirrors many of the activities performed at the joint intelligence centers and at the Defense Intelligence Agency. Can we eliminate needless duplication of effort by defining better the activities that should be performed at the joint level and those that need to be performed at the service level?

In this area again the fundamental question is not what is best for the individual services. The question is what is best for America?

Functional Organizations and Activities

So often the roles and missions debate focuses only on the fighting elements of the services—the tooth—and not on the support side, the so-called tail. The seventh area concerns functional organizations and activities.

Pilot Training

One good example is the area of pilot training. All of the military departments operate aircraft of all variety, and each of them has their own training program and schools for pilots. While each of the services needs to have service-specific training programs for advance pilot training—carrier landings, for example—every prospective pilot has to go through preliminary stages of training called undergraduate pilot training [UPT]. Undergraduate pilot training trains basic piloting skills, determines motor coordination skills, and teaches basic principles of navigation. As evidence that this is a common requirement, the Air Force and the Navy are jointly working to develop the next generation undergraduate pilot trainer aircraft.

The obvious question is if the service can develop a common airplane to train future pilots, can they cooperate and provide on behalf of the total department and consolidate their undergraduate flight training program?

The fundamental question is not what is best for the Navy or Marine Corps or Air Force. The question is what is best for America?

Helicopter Training

Similarly, both the Army and the Navy operate major helicopter training centers. While there is some justification for separate training activities for more advanced training techniques—such as helicopter landings at sea, nighttime assaults, and so forth—is there any reason for separate facilities for basic helicopter flight training? The Defense Department proposed to do this over 10 years ago and Congress blocked it. But the question again needs to be raised. Could basic helicopter flight training be assigned to one of the services?

The fundamental question is not what is best for the individual services. And I would say to my colleagues, as hard as it is for us, the issue is not what is best for our individual states or districts. The question is what is best for America?

Aerial Refueling

There are two kinds of air refueling aircraft—fast flying tankers [KC-10s and KC-135s] used to refuel jet aircraft and slow flying [KC-130s] tankers used to refuel helicopters. The Air Force operates all fast flying tankers on behalf of all the services, but the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Special Operations Forces operate KC-130s. Obviously each service will argue they need their

own tankers, but is that best for the Department as a whole? Could one of the services become the operator of all KC-130s for all DOD operations, the same way the Air Force operates jet-powered tankers?

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Electronic Surveillance

Both the Navy and the Air Force operate duplicative long-range electronic surveillance aircraft. The Air Force operates the RC-135s and the Navy the EP-3s. Neither aircraft has a very good modernization program because the services tend to emphasize combat rather than combat support missions. The obvious key question is this: Rather than let the Air Force pursue its program and the Navy pursue its preferred alternative, could the Department determine which technical approach is superior, assign the mission to one service, and consolidate all Department funding behind the combined approach?

The fundamental question again is not what is best for the individual services. The question is what is best for America?

Consolidate Medical Corps, Chaplains Corps, and Legal Departments

Each of the services has its own Medical Corps, Chaplain Corps, legal corps, and so forth. I am certain that each of the services would have valid arguments why it must have its own doctors, nurses, chaplains, and lawyers. I do not doubt that we need these professionals in each of the services. But one has to ask the larger question. [Should] we eliminate needless overhead by consolidating the administrative elements of the Medical Corps, the Chaplains Corps, the Nursing Corps, the Judge Advocate General Corps, and other such administrative service organizations?

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Logistics and Support Activities

The eighth area of potential streamlining is in the area of logistics and support activities. Each of the military departments operates its own industrial facilities or depots. Each of the services operates its own test and evaluation organizations and testing ranges.

I should point out that this is one area where the Department has started to act under the Defense Management Review. There are some important steps toward streamlining underway. For example, the Department is in the process of consolidating the finance and accounting centers of the services. But far more can be and needs to be done. This is a prime area where competition among the depots would enormously improve efficiency. Competition should not be limited to depots within a service, but should be opened up across service lines and between the private and public sectors. This should be a two-way competition. The depots should be able to compete for work traditionally done by contractors and contractors compete for work traditionally done by depots. The services are starting to do that, and should be congratulated for undertaking this.

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Administrative and Management Headquarters

Over the years the services have developed management and administrative headquarters to

manage a substantially larger force than we have today or will have in the future. With the ongoing reductions in the force, the strengthening of the unified commanders, and the emphasis on joint and combined operations, there is a pressing need to examine consolidations in administrative headquarters and functions.

The Air Force has done a good job, in my view, of attempting to streamline its internal administrative structure. The Navy and the Army have been reluctant to make sweeping administrative changes. But there is an even more important issue. Perhaps functions currently carried out by the services should be performed by unified command headquarters. I would suggest the services examine the following opportunities for streamlining.

Navy “Type” Commands

The Navy continues to have fleet commanders for its Atlantic and Pacific Fleet commands. For example, the Commander of the Atlantic Fleet commands all the ships in the Atlantic. But the Navy also has a commander of all the submarines in the Atlantic, and a commander of all the surface ships in the Atlantic and a commander of all the aircraft. Each of these commanders has his own headquarters and large staffs. And each of these areas has their own dedicated staffs and so-called stove pipe organizations in the Navy headquarters. In an era of combined arms, do these traditional Navy communities need their own command structure in the field and their own headquarters bureaucracies in the Pentagon?

Army Branches

Similarly, the Army is administratively organized into various branches. Some branches are warfighting branches, such as armor, infantry, and artillery. Other branches are administrative branches, such as transportation and finance. With today's integrated ground operations, does the Army continue to need so many separate branches with separate branch headquarters? The Army has three separate branches that do largely administrative work—the Quartermaster, Adjutant General, Finance branches. Could they be combined into a consolidated administrative branch? Does the Army staff continue to need 52 field operating agencies? The Army has an administrative layer of continental Army headquarters, administrative headquarters responsible for mobilizing reservists and civilians in the event of war. Are these continental Army headquarters still needed?

Unified Combatant Command Headquarters

Why are certain functions performed by separate service component headquarters not performed instead at unified combatant command headquarters? The Department has reorganized the Defense intelligence community in a way that led to a major reassignment of requirements and assets away from the service components and to the unified commands. Why cannot a similar reassignment take place with respect to elements of the operations, plans, training, and logistics functions?

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National Guard and Reserve Component Forces

The last area I would review today concerns the National Guard and Reserve component forces. For several years the Congress has been asking the Defense Department to undertake a careful and objective review of our Reserve component forces. Frankly, what we have is a mixed picture. The Air Force has the best record of the services in working closely with their reserve component counterparts.

As a matter of principle, I believe we are entering a period where we can place a greater share

of the burden on reserve forces. Reserve component forces provide the best approach for preserving needed capabilities at lower cost. At the same time, however, I believe we must undertake a thorough review of the missions we assign to our reserve component forces. Guard forces are unique in that they have both a national security and a domestic mission. At a time when our domestic needs are so great, how can we structure our reserve forces to meet both their national defense and state missions? Should we have so many of our reserve units in large combat organizations, or should we move toward smaller units, smaller combat units that can be made more ready in a more expeditious way and in a shorter time frame? What assignments and equipment should we provide to reserve component forces so that they are available to the governors of the states to contribute more effectively to help address critical needs in America? Again, the question is not what is best for the National Guard or the Reserve components or the Active Forces. The question is what is best for America?

Conclusion

As I said earlier, I do not underestimate the difficulty of the task before us. There is no harder problem facing our military. But we find ourselves in the midst of an historic time and opportunity. At no other time in the past 40 years have we had the three primary forces for change come together—the change in our security requirements, the change in technological opportunities, and the change in budget imperatives.

In coming weeks the Committee on Armed Services will markup the Defense authorization bill for fiscal year 1993. I hope that we can initiate a process to help stimulate the kind of far-reaching review that our times demand. As I mentioned earlier, my intention is to stimulate and facilitate General Powell's and the Department's efforts in this difficult task. It is far better for the Department to accomplish this review. Failing to deal with these issues means our military capability will be diminished by needless duplication and inefficiencies.

I do not have any illusions that the categories I have discussed are exhaustive. I solicit and welcome ideas and debate to help produce the constructive and bipartisan reform that was the hallmark of Goldwater-Nichols.

I yield the floor.